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Abstract
This paper proposes a new inferential framework for structural econometric
models using a nonparametric Bayesian approach. Although estimation methods
based on moment conditions can employ a °exible estimation without distri-
butional assumptions, they have di±culty conducting a prediction analysis. I
propose a nonparametric Bayesian methodology for an estimation and prediction
analysis. My methodology is applied to an empirical analysis of the Japanese
private nursing home market. This market has a sticky economic circumstance,
and my prediction simulates an intervention that removes this circumstance. The
prediction result implies that the outdated circumstance in this market is harmful
for consumers today.
Keywords: Nonparametric Bayes; Nonlinear simultaneous equation model; Pre-
diction; Industrial organization; Nursing home; Long-term care in Japan
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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a new methodology for structural econometrics using a nonpara-
metric Bayesian approach. In structural econometrics, especially when applied to
the industrial organization, many studies adopt estimation techniques, such as the
generalized method of moments(GMM), that rely on identi¯cation conditions in the
form of moment conditions, not distributional assumptions. Alternatively, much em-
pirical research focuses on further inferences in addition to estimation. Especially
since the introduction of the important Lucas criterion(Lucas, 1976), the availability
of prediction analysis for counterfactual economic situations is an important advan-
tage of structural studies. For advanced inferences, such as a prediction, however, a
numerical technique based on random number generation is often needed, and hence,
distributional assumptions are necessary. Because of this requirement, we cannot
always conduct prediction analysis with only moment conditions.
To resolve this problem, I adopt a nonparametric Bayesian approach. This in-
ferential framework is based on a likelihood function that can represent an arbitrary
distribution. Unlike the other nonparametric methodologies, such as kernel or spline
functions, the nonparametric Bayes approach can yield a closed form of a predictive
distribution function, which is required for numerical techniques. This property al-
lows for simultaneous estimation without distributional assumptions and prediction
analysis.
As an empirical application of my methodology, this paper analyzes the market
of private nursing homes in Japan. This market has an economic circumstance in the
form of a price mechanism where nursing homes assume all longevity risks of their
residents. This uneven market structure was established when the private nursing
homes were luxury goods. This situation has changed as a result of the launch of
the radical national long-term care insurance program in Japan, and private homes
today appear to be ordinary goods. Nevertheless, many homes still adopt this price
mechanism. This price mechanism is apparently a relief for elders whose only income
is their pension. However, a rational home must recover the ¯nancial burden of
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risks from a di®erent channel of payment. Therefore, there is a possibility that this
circumstance forces consumers to pay a larger amount of their lifetime payments
than if this price mechanism was nonexistent. My research question is whether this
mechanism is bene¯cial or not for consumers.
The structure of this market is understood with a nonlinear simultaneous equation
model that extends that of Berry et al. (1995), hereafter BLP. For this model, the
GMM estimation is a standard tool because it can easily manage the simultaneity
of many structural equations. I intend to extend the original BLP model, which
consists of demand and supply for a static good, to express the dynamic nature of the
nursing home market. The demand side in my model is the consumer optimization
of the present value of lifetime utility. For the supply side, following the conventional
approach of prior nursing home studies as summarized in Norton (2000), it is assumed
that homes maximize their pro¯t at the equilibrium.
To evaluate the economic impact of the peculiar price mechanism, a prediction
analysis is conducted to simulate an exogenous intervention that removes the mech-
anism. A previous study by Nevo (2000) provided a prediction technique for the
BLP model. In an analysis of mergers in the US ready-to-eat cereal industry, he
assumes that the e®ects of a merger would be so marginal that everything in the
model,including unobserved terms, remains the same. Under this assumption, the
prediction analysis is a deterministic problem that does not require any distributional
assumption for the unobserved variables. Due to its tractability, this methodology
has been adopted by many researchers, such as in the study of Petrin (2002) on the
impact of a new product, the minivan, on the automobile market. Alternatively, in
the Japanese nursing home market, a change in the price mechanism would have a
fundamental, not marginal, in°uence on the economy. Then, a more °exible method,
such as my nonparametric Bayesian approach, could simulate the counterfactual in-
tervention in the nursing home market.
I employ an empirical analysis using real data taken from the list of nursing homes
in the book Shuukan Asahi Mook (2011). My estimation results produce reasonable
estimates for each model parameter. Furthermore, my prediction analysis shows that
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the intervention reduces the lifetime total payments for residents, except those who
have unrealistically long lifetimes. A possible reason for the current overpayment is
consumers' inaccuracy in predicting their remaining lifetime. This result implies that
the outdated circumstance is harmful for consumers today.
This paper contributes to three ¯elds: nonparametric Bayesian statistics, applied
econometrics for the industrial organization ¯eld, and empirical studies of elder care.
First, in the literature of statistics, this study provides a new application ¯elds for
the nonparametric Bayesian method. Nonparametric Bayes methods have a long his-
tory from when Ferguson (1973) presented the Dirichlet process, which is the most
commonly used model in this literature today. Although the practical use of nonpara-
metric Bayes has expanded, only recently, along with the development of computer-
intensive Bayesian methodologies such as the Markov chain Monte Carlo(MCMC),
the method has been applied to various statistical ¯elds, as surveyed by Hjort et al.
(2010). In econometrics, Hirano (2002) applied a nonparametric Bayesian model
called the Dirichlet process mixture to dynamic panel models. Alternatively, this pa-
per is the ¯rst to apply nonparametric Bayesian methodology to a prediction analysis
in structural econometrics.
Second, as an applied econometric study, I present a new, °exible prediction tech-
nique for the BLP model. This model and its variants, such as those proposed by
Berry et al. (2004) and Berry and Pakes (2007), have already been applied to var-
ious industrial markets, such as the automobile retail market by BLP themselves,
a service sector by Davis (2006) and a durable good market by Gowrisankaran and
Rysman (2012), among others. Considering such wide applications, our methodology
can be useful for empirical industrial organization research. Regarding the statistical
concerns of the BLP model, this paper follows prior Bayesian research such as that
by Yang et al. (2003), Musalem et al. (2009) and Jiang et al. (2009). These studies
adopt parametric assumptions to implement an e±cient estimation algorithm via a
Gibbs sampler. My methodology provides an advantage in its °exibility due to the
nonparametric modeling and a disadvantage in terms of computational time because
of the demanding estimation technique via the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
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Third, this study contributes to empirical studies of long-term care for the elderly.
In developed countries, as the Baby Boom generation reaches older ages, elder care
has become an important policy issue. This situation has stimulated a wide variety
of empirical studies of long-term care using recent economic tools, such as an analysis
of long-term care insurance demands and information asymmetry by Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006) and within-family bargaining games for parental care by Engers and
Stern (2002) and Bryne et al. (2009). In the empirical industrial organization ¯eld,
a study closely related to this one by Mehta (2006) analyzed the US nursing home
market using the BLP model.
My study takes advantage of a unique dataset of the Japanese market. Japan is
experiencing some of the most drastic population aging in the world. To address this
situation, the country has adopted a national program of long-term care insurance
with universal coverage. Since the establishment of this program, the service sector
for long-term care has rapidly grown into a large industry. A purpose of this paper is
to share the implications of the Japanese experience that the rest of the world might
face in the future.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide a brief review
of the Japanese private nursing home market. Section 3 introduces my econometric
model, and Section 4 presents the corresponding econometric methodology. The
proposed method is applied to real data in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Japanese private nursing home market
This section presents a brief review of the private nursing home market in Japan. I
¯rst describe the current long-term elder care situation, which is united under the
national insurance program. Then, I provide to industrial details of the nursing home
market, especially its peculiar price mechanism, which is a main target of my research.
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2.1 The current status of elder care in Japan
Elder care once was a family task in Japan. The country has experienced overwhelm-
ingly rapid population-aging; therefore, maintaining a voluntary care system has been
di±cult. To remove the burden from families, the government ¯rst situated long-term
care in a welfare program till the 1970s and then in a medicine program. Because
those programs were not specially designed to meet the complicated demands of long-
term care, the programs' capacities were quickly exceeded. To manage the growing
demand for elder care, the national long-term care insurance program(LTCI) was
launched in the year 20001.
The LTCI is an insurance system with universal coverage. It covers long-term
care costs for two categories of insured people: Category 1 consists of all elderly aged
65 years or more, and Category 2 consists of those aged 40 to 64 years with aging-
related diseases. An insured person can ask the municipality authority to assign
a care eligibility level for him or her. Care eligibility levels are based on several
items, including activities of daily living(ADL) and instrumental activities of daily
living(IADL). There are seven eligibility levels, Assistance Required 1 and 2 and Care
Required 1 to 5; the latter levels cover costs for more intensive care. An upper bound
of monetary coverage and a set of available care services are prescribed by assigned
level. Out-of-pocket expenses are 10% of costs within the bound, and the rest are
covered by the LTCI. Services beyond the upper bound are available, but the excess
costs are completely out-of-pocket.
An important property of the LTCI is that it does not allow direct cash transfers
to elders or care givers, unlike the programs in Germany. In other words, the LTCI
covers only the care cost via the market, which has led to political debates. A main
supporting force for this system was the feminist movement for the \socialization" of
care. This movement demanded a release of women from providing voluntary care,
which is traditionally assigned to female family members, especially to the wife of
1See Ikegami and Campbell (2000) for details about the beginning of the program, including the
historical background. Tsutsui and Muramatsu (2007) summarized the current program after the
2005 reform.
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the ¯rst son. The government consented to this coverage because without the cash
allowance, many elders might not apply eligibility level assessment.
The LTCI has instantly created a large demand for long-term care services. This
sector rapidly shifted to a big industry. Both volume and range increased for this
sector. For volume, even during the long recession in the 2000s, the care service
sector showed a continuous growth, not only in sales additionally in the size of the
labor forces. The range of services has additionally increased in variety. In addition
to institutional care, which is commonly supplied through a market in developed
countries, other services include at-home care and short-term stay services.
2.2 The nursing home industry
This paper concentrates on nursing homes among the di®erent forms of institutional
care. There are both public and private homes in this sector2; their di®erences can be
summarized in the following three features. First, public homes provide uniform care
at uniform prices, while private homes provide divergent care at a variety of prices.
An explicit distinction is in the eligibility of residents. Public homes accept only
elders who cannot leave a bed by themselves, while private homes accept a variety
of residents. Speci¯cally, there are two general categories in private homes: homes in
one category provide care services as an option, while homes in the other category
provide care services as a default. In the former category, when a resident requires
permanent long-term care, he or she needs to exit the home. In the latter category, a
resident can stay in the home until his or her death. This paper focuses on the latter
category.
2I use the terms `public nursing home' and `private nursing home' as translations of Japanese
words `Tokubetsu-Yougo Roujin Houmu' and `Yuuryou Roujin Houmu,' respectively. Researchers
have not reached an agreement on the English term for private homes. For example, Ikegami and
Campbell (2000) called the private nursing home as `residential care with private-pay,' and Nonaka
et al. (2011) called the private nursing home as `Quasi institutional care.' In contrast to those authors,
I treat private homes as a form of nursing homes and juxtaposes them with public homes for two
reasons. First, they have a function that matches the standard de¯nition of a nursing home, to
provide general long-term cares that does not specialize in medical care for those who permanently
live in an institution. Second, the Japanese term `Roujin Home,' which means nursing home, is
commonly found in words `Tokubetsu-Yougo Roujin Houmu' and `Yuuryou Roujin Houmu,'. This
must represent the fact that these institutions are perceived as similar service goods by Japanese
people.
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Second, public homes are operated by a municipal authority or a non-pro¯t or-
ganization. For-pro¯t organizations cannot enter the public home market, only the
private home market3. Even though non-pro¯t organizations also can operate private
homes, our data indicate that more than 90% of private homes are for-pro¯t.
Third, LTCI coverage is another di®erence between public and private homes. In
public homes, the LTCI covers everything except \hotel costs," meaning rents and
foods4. In private homes, the LTCI covers only costs strictly categorized as care
costs. This type of cost is not included in an ordinary payment but is treated as a
person-speci¯c additional cost.
The co-existence of public and private homes has its roots in history5. The ¯rst
Japanese nursing homes were established in the late nineteenth century by religious
and philanthropic organizations as voluntary institutions for the poor and solitary
elderly. The legal basis of these institutions was ¯rst provided in 1923 as a part of
a governmental welfare program, but the amounts of the subsidies were limited. To
manage their operating costs, homes accepted \free contract" dwellers whose ¯nancial
status was beyond the eligibility level of the welfare program but who wanted to
receive institutional care. However, the quality of homes occasioned considerable
complaints from the free contractors because homes could provide only limited services
in the range of the national welfare program.
Private nursing homes were formed during this time to meet the demand of the
free contractors. Although the exact origin is blurry, a record from as early as 1948
has been found about an active private nursing home. In 1963, the Act on the
Social Welfare Service for Elderly(Roujin Fukushi Hou) updated the legal system
of the long-term care sector. This act prohibited public homes from accepting any
free contract resident. The act additionally prescribed legal requirements for private
nursing homes for the ¯rst time. In other words, this act explicitly separated public
and private nursing homes.
3Mitchel et al. (2004) stated that for-pro¯t ¯rms are not allowed to enter the institutional care
market. This statement is true because the authors de¯ne the institutional care only as public homes.
4The hotel costs for public homes were once in the range of coverage of the LTCI but were
eliminated by the 2005 reform.
5This part is drawn primarily from Momose (1997) and Sudou (2006a,b).
8
Until the 1990's, the only residents in private homes were high income elders, and
the public homes functioned as a safety net. Several luxury private homes attracted
wide attention in the Japanese \bubble" economy in the late 1980s. Then the launch
of the LTCI has had a considerable in°uence on the nursing home market.
Table 1 is here
Table 1 describes the number of facilities and residential capacities for public and
private nursing homes from the years immediately before the launch of the LTCI until
recently6. The ratio of private to public home capacity was approximately 1 to 2:5
in 2009, although the ratio was 1 to 9 in 1999. Clearly, the market for private homes
has been expanding much more quickly than that of the public home market.
The slow growth of the public home market is a result of a regulatory policy, which
was caused by a rapid increase in the ¯nancial burden. In the ¯rst several years of
the LTCI, the number of eligible elders grew more quickly than prior governmental
estimates7. To slow the budget expansion, municipalities suppressed the establish-
ment of new homes. This policy induces a long waiting list of elders, estimated to be
421,0008. The elderly typically spend years in several rehabilitation facilities, which
are temporary care institutions between hospitals and public homes, until a vacancy
arises in a public home. Because of such exogenous restrictions on the supply of public
homes, I do not consider the crowding-out e®ects of public homes on private home
demand in this study.
Because the LTCI additionally covers costs for private homes, municipalities sought
to control their number as well. To provide a legal basis for this motivation, the na-
tional government announced the \Regulation of Volume"(Souryou Kisei) in 20059.
6The numbers are taken from the Survey on Institutions and Establishments for Long-Term Care
for public homes after 2000, and the Survey on Social Welfare Institutions for public homes in 1999
and private homes for the whole periods. The numbers can be traced through more recent years, but
the ¯gures after 2009 have a problem with consistency. Because the research agents have changed
from the government to private ¯rms, the response rate has drastically dropped.
7See Campbell et al. (2010).
8The ¯gure is taken from the press release by the Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare,
December 2009. http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000003byd.html.
9As reviewed in the paper by Mehta (2006), there is a similar regulation for a number of the
nursing homes in the United States that is called the control of need (CON), which restricts an
expansion of the Medicaid budget.
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This regulation stated that in 2014, the rate of elders who in care institutions must
be less than 37% of those with eligibility levels of Care-Required or higher. This regu-
lation forces many municipalities to prevent the entry of new private homes, because
the average rate already reached 41% in 2004. After active debates on this regulation,
the government abandoned it in 2012. As seen in Table 1, this regulation had an e®ect
on the market, as implied by the reduction in the growth after 2005. This reduction
implies that the amount of potential demand for the nursing homes must be larger
than their actual supply.
2.3 A peculiar price mechanism of private nursing homes
Next, I explain the peculiar price mechanism of the private nursing home market. To
live in a private home, typical contracts require a resident to make both of two forms
of the payments. The ¯rst payment is a monthly fee that covers the costs of daily
needs. The second payment is paid at the time of the resident's entrance to the home
and is called an initial payment. The amount of the initial payment is determined as
rent during an expiration period of which the length is predetermined by the home.
If a resident exits the home before the expiration, the rents for the remaining periods
are paid back. On the other hand, if a resident lives longer than the expiration, he or
she does not need to pay additional rent10.
Under this contract, homes assume all longevity risks of their residents. It is legally
possible to o®er a contract where the rent is collected not by the initial payment but
by the monthly fee to avoid the longevity risk. However, the percent of homes that
exercise a contract without an initial payment is less than 35% in our dataset. In
addition, most of the homes o®er only one expiration period, which implies that homes
do not practice price discrimination to manage the longevity risk.
This mechanism is a residual of the past, when private homes were perceived as a
luxury good and consumers paid an expensive initial payment with a long expiration.
10Some portion of the initial payment is called an initial depreciation, which is not returned when
the resident exits before the expiration. In the empirical analysis, I assume that a home does not
collect the initial payment if initial depreciation is 100% of the initial payment. Otherwise, I do not
re°ect the initial depreciation in the de¯nition of the price variables for simplicity.
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With such limited demand, the price mechanism could have been a Nash equilibrium
in those days. However, as Table 1 indicates, the nursing home industry has been
experiencing an overwhelming transition in which the private homes are more familiar
goods for ordinary consumers as a substitute for the long waiting lists in the public
homes. Thus, whether this sticky circumstance is preferable from the perspective of
the social welfare today is uncertain.
A brief review of the nursing home market in the United States may be helpful.
As summarized in Norton (2000), the United States has a very di®erent system from
Japan's, called the Medicaid spend-down. In this system, the care costs are completely
paid by consumers. When consumers can no longer a®ord the costs, the government
assume them in the form of Medicaid, which is a public insurance system for low-
income individuals. This system is based on the perspective of the safety-net, which
di®ers from the Japanese universal care policy.
3 A structural econometric model for the nursing home
market
3.1 De¯ning a market environment
In this section, I construct a structural econometric model similar to the BLP model
for the Japanese private nursing home market. To explore the properties of the
nursing home market, I make several extensions to the conventional model. I begin
with describing the basic setup and notation in this subsection and proceed to details
of my extension in the following subsections.
There are M local markets that are geographically isolated. Each market m has
both demand and supply. The demand side consists of Im consumers, and the supply
side consists of Hm private nursing homes. The consumers decide among Hm private
homes and an outside option. The outside option represents anything other than a
private home, such as public homes, formal at-home care or informal family care.
The consumer population Im contains all the consumers who might enter a private
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home. An important ¯nding of Berry et al. (1995) found that all the parameters can be
identi¯ed with only ¯rms-side observations; consumer-side information is unnecessary.
Due to this ¯nding, the dataset for this study consists of the observed characteristics
of H =
P
mHm nursing homes.
The economy is assumed to be in equilibrium in two senses. First, the supply
and demand sides equate as a general equilibrium. Second, the supply side is an
oligopolistic game, which results in the Nash equilibrium strategy pro¯les. I assume
that there is a unique Nash equilibrium. This assumption is stronger than the con-
ventional assumption that the dataset is generated from a unique equilibrium among
possibly multiple equilibria. As mentioned in footnote 12 of Berry et al. (1995, p.853),
to conduct a policy prediction, the economy is required to play the same equilibrium
under the counterfactual situation. This requirement is not guaranteed if we assume
the uniqueness of only the realized data-generating process.
There are several observable variables for equilibrium prices: For each hm =
1; :::;Hm, phm is a monthly fee and Fhm is an initial payment, which corresponds to
rents for an expiration period, namely Thm months. I make a variable for a monthly
rent fhm as fhm = Fhm=Thm if Thm 6= 0 or fhm = 0 if Thm = 0. fhm is assumed to
be exogenously determined in the housing market. I introduce vector notations for
home speci¯c variables such as pm = (p1m ; :::; pHm)0 and p = (p01; :::;p0M )
0 where each
component is indexed as ph for h = 1; 2; :::;H.
As a clear distinction between my model and the conventional, static framework
of the BLP model, I consider the dynamic nature of nursing homes. An important
factor for a dynamic model is consumers' lifetimes, which I denote ¿im for the imth
consumer. Consumer lifetimes might be uncertain for both the homes and the con-
sumers themselves. This particular uncertainty is carefully modeled in the following
subsections.
3.2 Modeling the demand side
My model for the demand side represents consumer optimization. I assume that
consumers maximize the present value of their lifetime utility. For simplicity, I assume
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that there is no voluntary exit from a home, and hence, any exit is due to the resident's
death, to avoid the complication of endogenous exit decisions. Then, the control
variable of consumers in the mth market is their one-shot entrance decision among
Hm private homes and an outside option.
In formulating the dynamic optimization, there is uncertainty regarding each con-
sumer's lifetime, which is a time horizon of the present value calculation. It is di±cult
to consider an expected utility with respect to the stochastic horizon. Instead, I as-
sume that consumers evaluates their remaining lifetime with a subjective prediction,
which might be misspeci¯ed. Although I do not construct a speci¯c model, the mis-
speci¯cation can exist for various reasons, such as a simple fallacy or an arbitrary
over-evaluation for a risk management. This predicted value is consumer-speci¯c and
denoted as ¿ Iim for the imth consumer.
For the utility components, I add explicit functional assumptions in this paper.
Speci¯cally, the utility function for a period takes the form of a linear function of
an observable Kd £ 1 vector ~xhm , an unobservable home-speci¯c e®ect »hm and an
individual-home match speci¯c e®ect ~´imhm . In the present values of the future utili-
ties, each consumer im has private information regarding his or her remaining lifetime
in month ¿im ¸ 1 and time-discount rate ±im 2 (0; 1). Consequently, the present value
of the lifetime utility of the consumer im from the choice of hmth home is
Uimhm =
¿IimX
t=1
±t¡1im [~x
0
hm
~¯
d + »hm + ~´imhm ]¡ P (phm ; fhm ; Thm ; ¿ Iim ; ±im)®; (3.1)
where ¡® measures a disutility from a unit expenditure in terms of the present value
utility, and hence, ® > 0 is required. P denotes the present value of the payment
stream de¯ned as
P (phm ; fhm ; Thm ; ¿
I
im ; ±im) =
¿IimX
t=1
±t¡1im phm + Fhm ¡ I[Thm ¸ ¿ Iim ]±
¿Iim
im
(Thm ¡ ¿ Iim)fhm :
(3.2)
The right-hand side of the above equation consists of three parts. The ¯rst term
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represents the present value of monthly fees during the lifetime. The second term is
an initial payment in a lump sum, which does not depend on ±im because it is paid
in full upon the start of living in the home, i.e., t = 1. The third term corresponds to
the returns to the initial payment if the consumer would dies before the expiration,
i.e., Thm ¸ ¿ Iim . A calculation yields
Uimhm =
1¡ ±¿
I
im
im
1¡ ±im
"³
~x0hm ~¯d ¡ phm®+ »hm + ~´imhm
´
¡Fhm
1¡ ±im
1¡ ±¿
I
im
im
®+ fhm
1¡ ±im
1¡ ±¿
I
im
im
±
¿Iim
im
I[Thm ¸ ¿ Iim ](Thm ¡ ¿ Iim)®
#
:(3.3)
In (3.3), I decompose the term of Fhm into a mean and an individual variation as
¡Fhm
1¡ ±im
1¡ ±¿
I
im
im
® = Fhm®F + ´F;im ; (3.4)
where E[´F;im ] = 0. I re¯ne xhm = (~x
0
hm
; Fhm)
0, ¯d = ( ~¯0d;¡®F )0 and
´imhm = ´F;im + ~´imhm + fhm
1¡ ±im
1¡ ±¿
I
im
im
±
¿Iim
im
I[Thm ¸ ¿ Iim ](Thm ¡ ¿ Iim): (3.5)
Further, I de¯ne
Vimhm = [(1¡ ±im)=(1¡ ±
¿Iim
im
)]Uimhm (3.6)
= x0hm¯d ¡ phm®+ »hm + ´imhm : (3.7)
Now a consumer chooses to enter the hmth home if Uimhm = maxkm2f0;1;2;:::;HmgfUimkmg
or Vimhm = maxkm2f0;1;2;:::;HmgfVimkmg, where the subscript 0 represents an outside
option for which I assume Vim0 = ´im0.
I do not observe individual consumers' decisions, only market shares of homes. To
establish an econometric model without individual variations, I assume ´imhm follows
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the i.i.d. type I extreme value distribution and integrate it out from the demand side
model as
shm =
Z
Vimhm=maxj2f0;1;2;:::;HmgfVimjg
Vimhm¼(d´m) (3.8)
=
8><>:
exp[x0hm¯d¡phm®+»hm ]
1+
PHm
km=1
exp[x0km¯d¡pkm®+»km ]
for hm = 1; :::;Hm
1
1+
PHm
km=1
exp[x0km¯d¡pkm®+»km ]
for hm = 0
: (3.9)
To ¯nish the demand side modeling, I let qhm be the logarithm of the share for
hm = 1; 2; :::;Hm, which is expressed as
qhm = x
0
hm¯d ¡ phm®+ »hm + ln
³
1¡
HmX
km=1
exp(qkm)
´
: (3.10)
3.3 Modeling the supply side
On the supply side, I construct a model for the pro¯t maximization of private nurs-
ing homes. Following previous nursing home studies, which are surveyed in Norton
(2000), I assume that homes maximize their expected pro¯t at a steady state for their
occupancy status. This assumption is required to avoid a complicated situation in
which there are residents whose durations of residence overlap. In the equilibrium,
the marginal pro¯t function from the ith consumer for the hmth home takes the form
¦hm(¿im) = phm + fhm ¡mchm ¡ fhmI[Thm < ¿im ]; (3.11)
where mchm is the marginal cost for the hmth resident.
Homes maximize their expected pro¯t in which the per capita pro¯t is de¯ned by
equation (3.11). In the general equilibrium, the market clearing condition indicates
that the expectation is taken with respect the consumer's subject value ¿ Iim and not
to the true value. For this purpose, I assume that homes know the distribution of the
consumers' subjective values ¿ Iim . Under this assumption, Imshm is the equilibrium
number of residents.
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Homes play a Beltrand-type competition in which phm and Thm are control vari-
ables. Because these two control variables are complementary, I assume that homes
¯rstly decide Thm and choose phm given Thm . I further assume that a home's expec-
tations for their customers' lifetimes are determined only with Thm and fhm with-
out phm . In other words, homes choose Thm to control for whom they attract,
and phm determines how to manage expenditures given presumed customers. Let
Prs(Thm < ¿ jfhm ; Thm) be a home's subjective probability that a resident in the
home has a lifetime longer than Thm in the steady state. From the assumption on the
decision process for Thm and pm, this subjective probability does not depend on the
monthly fee. Consequently, I obtain the expected pro¯t function as
¦hm = Imshm
h
phm + fhm ¡mchm ¡ fhmPrs(Thm < ¿ jfhm ; Thm)
i
: (3.12)
I assume the existence of an interior solution for the pro¯t maximization problem.
The ¯rst order condition for phm yields
(
phm ¡mchm + fhm
h
1¡ Prs(Thm < ¿ jfhm ; Thm)
i)@shm
@phm
+ shm = 0: (3.13)
The above equation can be more explicit using the general equilibrium value of shm
derived from the demand side. Speci¯cally, I substitute the closed form of @shm=@phm
and obtain
phm +
1
®(shm ¡ 1)
+ fhm [1¡ Prs(Thm < ¿ jfhm ; Thm)] = mchm : (3.14)
Following the conventional approach, I assume a log-linear form of the marginal
cost function. Speci¯cally, the logarithm of the marginal cost is set to be a linear
function of an observable Ks£1 vector whm and an unobservable home speci¯c e®ect
!hm . Several manipulations yield
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phm = exp(whm¯s + !hm)¡
1
®[exp(qhm)¡ 1]
¡ fhm
h
1¡ Prs(Thm < ¿ jfhm ; Thm)
i)
:
(3.15)
In the above ¯rst-order condition for phm , I assume that the subjective probability
function can be represented as
1¡ Prs(Thm < ¿ jfhm ; Thm) = ¡(Thm ; fhm ;°) (3.16)
def
=
exp(°0 + °T1Thm + °T2T
2
hm
+ °f1fhm + °f2f
2
hm
+ °TFThmfhm)
1 + exp(°0 + °T1Thm + °T2T 2hm + °f1fhm + °f2f
2
hm
+ °TFThmfhm)
;
(3.17)
where ° = (°0; °T1; °T2; °f1; °f2; °Tf )0.
The above demand and supply sides modeling induces a simultaneous equation sys-
tem that consists of 2Hm structural equations (3.10) and (3.15) for hm = 1; :::;Hm. In
this model, the dependent variables are (qm;pm), unobserved variables are (»m;!m),
and the coe±cient parameters are ~µ = (¯0d;¯
0
s; ®;°
0)0.
4 An econometric framework via nonparametric Bayes
This section details an econometric analysis for the model presented in the last sec-
tion. I begin with a general form of the BLP model to explain the di±culty of using
the GMM to conduct predictions. Then, I provide an alternative method via a non-
parametric Bayesian approach for the general model. Next, I narrow my attention
to my variant of the BLP model for the private nursing home market to present
corresponding estimation procedures and a prediction. Last, I discuss identi¯cation
conditions for this model and required assumptions.
4.1 Di±culty of the GMM for prediction analysis
I ¯rst explain a di±culty of estimation methodologies based only on moment condi-
tions to conduct a prediction analysis. This statement holds for structural econometric
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models in general, but I concentrate on the BLP model in this paper.
Take any market m. For hm = 1; :::;Hm, the BLP model can be written in a
general form as
qhm = fq(pm; q(¡hm);whm ; !hm ;µ); (4.1)
phm = fp(p(¡hm); qm;xhm ; »hm ;µ); (4.2)
where q(¡hm) = (q1; :::; qhm¡1; qhm+1; :::; qHm) and p(¡hm) is similarly de¯ned. fq and
fp denote nonlinear functions known up to the parameter µ. Particularly in my model,
they represent the right-hand sides of (3.10) and (3.15). Equilibrium conditions yield
that these 2Hm equations comprise a simultaneous equation system. Conventional
estimation methods are employed based on moment conditions in the form of E[z»] =
E[z!] = 0, where z is some instrument. For this nonlinear simultaneous model, the
moment conditions induce more simpler estimation methods than a method via a
likelihood function, which is a complicated joint distribution accompanied by 2Hm
nonlinear structural equations. This is the reason why GMM estimation is a standard
econometric tool for the BLP model.
As an illustrative example of a prediction analysis, let us consider a prediction
problem for p given counterfactual xm = ~x. For simplicity, I assume that the reduced
form is analytically obtained for phm as
phm = gp(xm;wm; »m;!m;µ): (4.3)
There are three unknown factors, namely »m, !m and µ, on the right-hand side
of the above equations. For µ, GMM estimates can be used. However, there the
problem of the unobservables (»m;!m) still exists.
Nevo (2000) proposed a method to manage these unobserved variables. His study
investigates the e®ects of a merger in the US cereal industry. In the prediction for
a counterfactual merger, he assumed that everything other than the merger status
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is kept unchanged. Under this assumption, counterfactual values of the explanatory
variables are predicted using the same values of (»m;!m). Speci¯cally, Nevo (2000)
substituted the values of the estimated residuals into the reduced form equation (4.3).
Due to its tractability, many studies adopt this methodology.
In my case, the counterfactual situation, a di®erent payment mechanism imposes a
more drastic change for the market structure than the counterfactual in those studies.
To re°ect this large change, I rather want to allow di®erent values of (»m;!m) under
the counterfactual situation. Therefore, I set these unobservables as stochastic terms
in the prediction analysis and integrate them from the reduced form (4.3).
Under the conventional moment condition, however, such integration is feasible
only when the reduced form gp takes speci¯c forms. One example is the reduced form
that is additive and separable with respect to (»m;!m) such that
phm = gp(xm;wm; »m;!m;µ) = ~gp(xm;wm;µ) + a
0»m + b0!m; (4.4)
where a and b are constant vectors. By multiplying both sides by zm, we can integrate
out the terms for (»m;!m) using the moment conditions. However, it is di±cult to
guarantee such an assumption because gp is a reduced form. In general, we need to
conduct a numerical integration for (»m;!m) using a Monte Carlo algorithm that
requires distributional assumptions. In addition, because the model has as many as
2Hm simultaneous equations, another numerical step is often needed to obtain the
reduced form.
4.2 Introducing a nonparametric Bayesian approach
In this subsection, I introduce a nonparametric Bayesian approach for both estima-
tion and prediction without distributional assumptions. The nonparametric Bayesian
analysis can be summarized as a statistical methodology via a likelihood function
which can represent an arbitrary distribution. Unlike the other nonparametric mod-
els, such as kernel or spline methods, the nonparametric Bayes models are associated
with well-de¯ned closed forms for the likelihood function and predictive distributions.
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This feature enables us to conduct a numerical integration in a prediction analysis.
I incorporate nonparametric modeling for »hm and !hm . Speci¯cally, I assume xhm
and whm include constant terms, and »hm and !hm represent home-speci¯c stochastic
terms with constraints on their moments. Because it is di±cult to adopt a mean
restriction in nonparametric Bayes models, I incorporate medians conditions, such
that Med(»hm) = Med(!hm) = 0 in this paper.
In the nonparametric Bayesian literature, there are two popular approaches for
managing such median constraints. One is the Dirichlet process mixture with restric-
tions, such as implemented in the studies by Doss (1985) and Kottas and Gelfand
(2001). Another approach is the Polya tree mixture, which I use in this paper. The
Polya tree mixture was established by Hanson and Johnson (2002) as an extension
of the Polya tree proposed by Ferguson (1974). This original Polya tree is a general,
nonparametric Bayes model that includes the Dirichlet process as a special case. In
the 1990s, several papers were published on the theoretical aspects of the Polya tree,
such as those by Lavine (1992, 1994) and Mauldin et al. (1992). More recent papers
have presented computational procedures with applications, such as those by Hanson
(2006), Jara et al. (2009) and Hanson et al. (2011).
An intuitive way to de¯ne a nonparametric likelihood function is through predic-
tive densities. Let us consider a problem of estimating a joint conditional distribution
for (!1; !2:::; !H) given ~µ, where a scalar random variable !h has a common support
­ for all i. Suppose we have nonparametric predictive densities ¼(!hj!1; :::; !h¡1; ~µ)
for all h = 1; :::;H. Then, the joint conditional density function can be derived as
¼(!1; :::; !H j~µ) = ¼(!1jµ)¼(!2j!1; ~µ)¼(!3j!1; !2; ~µ):::¼(!H j!1; :::; !H¡1; ~µ): (4.5)
The main concern for this setting is a choice of a nonparametric prediction dis-
tribution. An intuitive candidate is a histogram, given previous !s. The Polya tree
mixture is a method that constructs nonparametric predictive distributions similar
to the histogram. I describe the detailed de¯nition in Appendix A.
The Polya tree mixture has three primitives that econometricians need to specify.
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The ¯rst is the base measure, which is used to de¯ne the bins of the histogram. I
employ N(0; 1=¿) as my base measure for the analysis of Japanese nursing homes. ¿
is a scale parameter that is to be estimated. The second is the hyperparameters of
the Polya tree prior, ®j;kj for j = 1; :::; J and kj = 1; 2; :::; 2
j . I adopt a conventional
choice introduced by Hanson and Johnson (2002), which is aj;kj = cj
2 for all kj with
a constant c. The third is the truncation level J . Choices for c and J are case-speci¯c
subjects, and I discuss them further in the empirical analysis section.
4.3 A Bayesian estimation procedure
4.3.1 The likelihood function
From this subsection, I describe the inferential framework that is speci¯c to the econo-
metric model for the Japanese nursing home market, which consists of structural
equations (3.10) and (3.15). Because of the mutual dependencies of the dependent
variables, these structural equations cannot be directly used to de¯ne the likelihood
function. Instead, I obtain the likelihood function using a change of variables from
unobservables to dependent variables, as suggested by Chintagunta and Dub¶e (2005).
For distributions of unobservable terms, I assume that they follow independent Polya
tree mixtures whose scale parameters are ¿» and ¿!. Then, the resulting likelihood
function is
¼(p; qjµ;Data) =
h MY
m=1
jdet(Jm)j
i
¼!;»[!11(p1; q1; f11 ; T11 ; ~µ); »11(p1; q1; f11 ; T11 ; ~µ);
!21(p1; q1; f21 ; T21 ; ~µ); »21(p1; q1; f21 ; T21 ; ~µ);
:::; !H1(p1; q1; fH1 ; TH1 ; ~µ); »H1(p1; q1; fH1 ; TH1 ; ~µ);
:::; !HM (pM ; qM ; fHM ; THM ; ~µ); »HM (pM ; qM ; fHM ; THM ; ~µ)]; (4.6)
where Jm is the Jacobian matrix of the transformation, which is explicitly derived in
Appendix B. µ = (~µ0; ¿»; ¿!)0 denotes a vector of all the parameters and
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»hm(pm; qm; fhm ; Thm ; ~µ) = qhm ¡ ln
h
1¡
HmX
km=1
exp(qkm)
i
¡ ~x0hm ~¯d + Thmfhm®F + phm®;
(4.7)
!hm(pm; qm; fhm ; Thm ; ~µ) = ln
"
phm +
1
®[exp(qhm)¡ 1]
+ fhm¡(Thm ; fhm ;°)
#
¡w0hm¯s:
(4.8)
In the above likelihood function, I require additional restrictions for the supports
of the dependent variables to have well-de¯ned logarithmic terms. Speci¯cally,
0 < 1¡
HmX
km=1
exp(qkm); (4.9)
0 < phm +
1
®[exp(qhm)¡ 1]
+ fhm¡(Thm ; fhm ;°): (4.10)
Condition (4.9) is automatically satis¯ed in the estimation step due to the con-
struction of qhm in Section 3, but it must be veri¯ed in the prediction step described
below. Another condition, (4.10), is required in the estimation and prediction steps.
Furthermore, because (4.10) states that the support of the likelihood function de-
pends on parameters ® and °, (4.10) violates a regularity condition for maximum
likelihood estimators to have preferable asymptotic properties. This fact is another
motivation to adopt a Bayesian estimation procedure.
4.3.2 Prior and proposal distributions
I implement the Bayesian estimation using the Markov chain Monte Carlo(MCMC)
algorithm. Due to the construction of the Polya tree mixture using histogram-like
stochastic structures, the likelihood is not a smooth function of parameters. I then
adopt the Metropolis-Hastings(MH) algorithm via random walk proposal distribu-
tions. The prior and proposal distributions are speci¯ed as follows.
For prior distributions, I assume that the coe±cient parameters follow indepen-
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dent normal distributions and that the scale parameters of the Polya tree mixtures,
each of which is an inverse of the variance, follow independent Gamma distributions.
Speci¯cally,
¯d » N(¹¯d0;§¯d0); ¯s » N(¹¯s0;§¯s0); (4.11)
° » N(¹°0;§°0); ® » N(¹®0; ¾2®0); (4.12)
¿! » Gamma(a¿!10; a¿!20); ¿» » Gamma(a¿»10; a¿»20); (4.13)
where Gamma denotes the Gamma distribution.
For proposal distributions, I choose distributions that can impose support con-
ditions described so far. First, for unconstrained parameters ¯d and ¯w, I use the
normal proposal distributions. Second, for ¿» and ¿!, the proposal distributions are
set as log-normal distributions to guarantee their positivity. Third, a truncated nor-
mal proposal is incorporated for ° to satisfy the support conditions (4.9) and (4.10).
Finally, for ®, which must be positive and satisfy the support condition, I use the
truncated log-normal proposal distribution.
4.4 Numerical techniques for a counterfactual prediction
The main purpose of this study is to simulate an exogenous intervention that elimi-
nates the initial payment mechanism. Although we want to compare consumer welfare
before and after the intervention, it is di±cult to derive utility functions because a
consumer lifetime and the time-discount factor are not observed. Instead, I conduct
a comparison of the total amount of lifetime payments. My prediction analysis con-
sists of two parts: the prediction for monthly fees phm after the intervention and the
calculation of the total payments both before and after the intervention.
To predict the monthly fee, I assume that ´imhm has the same distribution after
the intervention. Considering the fact that ´imhm depends on Thm and fhm , this is a
strong assumption but is technically required to conduct a prediction analysis. Given
this assumption, the intervention yields the same economic model as (3.10) and (3.15)
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in which fnewhm = 0 and T
new
hm
= 0.
4.4.1 Algorithms to predict monthly fees
To predict phm , I consider the predictive mean:
E[pnewhm jfnewhm = 0; Tnewhm = 0;Data] (4.14)
=
Z Z
phm¼(phm jTnewhm = 0; fnewhm = 0; Data;µ)¼(µjData)dphmdµ:
I conduct a dual-loop Monte Carlo integral to calculate the double integral nu-
merically. Further, phm must be integrated on the marginal distribution, which corre-
sponds to the reduced form. Because of the mutual dependency of phm and the other
dependent variables, it is di±cult to obtain a closed form of the reduced form ana-
lytically. Thus, a numerical solution for the simultaneous equation is required. The
numerical procedure is summarized as follows. Let L and R be appropriately large
integers as the numbers of the iterations for outer and inner loops of the Monte Carlo
integration, respectively. The inner loop is accompanied by the numerical solution.
The outer loop approximates the integral with respect to µ. I generate random
numbers µl, l = 1; 2; :::; L from the posterior distribution of µjData. I can adopt the
posterior samples of the MCMC estimation as the random numbers in this step.
The inner loop implements the integral for phm . Given µ
l, I generate prlhm , r =
1; 2; :::; R from the distribution of plrhm jfnewhm = 0; Tnewhm = 0;µl;Data. To conduct the
numerical solution, I implement the MCMC sampling for the inner loop. As sum-
marized in Appendix C, I have closed forms for conditional predictive distributions
for qnewhm jpnewm ; qnew(¡hm); fnewhm = 0; Tnewhm = 0;µ;Data and pnewhm jqnewm ;pnew(¡hm); fnewhm =
0; Tnewhm = 0;µ;Data for hm = 1; 2; :::;Hm. Then, I iteratively draw the random
samples from these conditional distributions, given the previous draws. After an
appropriate length of the burn-in periods R0, I have random draws from marginal
predictive distributions, which can serve as prlnew.
Finally, I approximate the double integral by (1=L)
PL
l=1(1=R)
PR
r=1 p
rl
hm
. In the
above steps, the inner loop is computationally burdensome, but it can be conducted
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separately for each market. Due to this separability, I focus on a speci¯c market in
the empirical analysis.
4.4.2 Policy evaluation through predicting lifetime payments
Hereafter, I assume that the predicted values for a monthly fee after the intervention
pnewhm is already derived using the dual-loop Monte Carlo integral. To calculate the
lifetime payments before and after the intervention, I begin with considering a match
of a resident im and hm. The total payment after the intervention is the accumulated
monthly fees throughout the resident's lifetime ¿im , because there is no other form
of a payment than the monthly fee. Then, the predicted total payment is pnewhm ¿im .
Because I do not consider an interest rate but use a simple summation, this amount
is a lower bound of the present value of the consumer's total payment.
There is a di±culty in that the amount of the lifetime payment before the inter-
vention depends on values of ¿im and Thm . To illustrate the problem, I separately
consider three cases where the ¯rst two cases are not troublesome but the last case
is problematic. The ¯rst case is Thm = 0, where the home does not collect an initial
payment, even in the current situation. I abbreviate this case for my prediction anal-
ysis because we do not have a particular interest in this case. For the remaining two
cases, we assume Thm > 0.
The second case is ¿im · Thm . This case is denoted as \short-lived" because the
imth consumer has a shorter lifetime than the expiration date. For this case, the
lifetime payment before the intervention is (phm + fhm)¿im . Because the payments
before and after the intervention are both multiplied by ¿im , I can cancel this term out
when comparing the lifetime payments. Thus, the intervention e®ect can be detected
through a comparison between phm + fhm and p
new
hm
, regardless of ¿im .
The third case is ¿im > Thm , which is denoted as \long-lived". In this case, the
consumer before the intervention does not need to pay rents after the expiration date.
As a result, the lifetime payment before the intervention is phm¿im + fhmThm . Unlike
the previous case, I cannot ignore the unobservable lifetime ¿im when comparing the
lifetime payments. In practice, I consider several representative consumers whose
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lifetimes are ¿im = 240 and 360. Because the lifetime is measured in months, these
values correspond to 20 and 30 years of remaining life.
4.5 Identi¯cation
This subsection illustrates the identi¯cation conditions for my econometric framework.
Identi¯cation of my model depends on three factors: distributional assumptions, func-
tional form assumptions and exclusion restrictions, discussed below.
For the distributional and functional forms, I have made several assumptions so
far. The assumptions as a whole do not allow to specify individual heterogeneity, as
a price to implement a nonparametric Bayesian method. Speci¯cally, there are two
elements which are commonly included in the previous studies but eliminated in my
study.
The ¯rst is random coe±cient modeling. For example, in equation (3.4), the
traditional approach includes individual variations in coe±cients, whereas I locate
them in the error term and integrate out. This is because the existence of such a
random coe±cient term makes it di±cult to obtain closed form expressions of error
terms as in (4.7) and (4.8), which are required for the construction of the likelihood
and the predictive density functions.
Second, there may be a consumer heterogeneity which a®ects the distribution of
the individual-speci¯c term ´. In this paper, I used a logit model for the distribution
of this term. Third, we eliminate any endogeneity among unobservables. In the
previous studies, such an endogeneity is assumed to exist and is controlled using the
instrument. This paper ignores this endogeneity because of a technical di±culty of
multivariate histograms. For the above two shortcuts, the °exibility of nonparametric
Bayesian model can re°ect these e®ects.
To specify the requirements of the exclusion restrictions, given (3.10) and (3.15),
we can obtain conditional distributions for qhm jphm ; q(¡hm); »hm and phm jqhm ; !hm .
Therefore, for the demand side, a standard exclusion restriction that is not correlated
to phm and q(¡hm) but is correlated to qhm is required. For the supply side, I have
conditional independency, such that phm is independent from p(¡hm) and q(¡hm) given
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qhm . Thus, having exclusion restrictions that are not home-speci¯c but market-speci¯c
variables is su±cient.
5 An empirical study of the Japanese nursing home mar-
ket
5.1 Data
This section applies my methodology to real data on the Japanese private nursing
home market. In principle, the required information for this study is found in the
public domain in the sense that private nursing homes are legally obligated to disclose
the information when asked. Because it is burdensome to obtain a disclosure for all
the homes, I refer to a list in a consumers' guidebook, Shuukan Asahi Mook (2011),
which is a special volume of a leading weekly news magazine in Japan.
The local markets m = 1; 2; :::;M are de¯ned as prefectures, which are the largest
subnational jurisdictions in Japan. An important assumption for the BLP model is
that markets are geographically isolated. To guarantee this assumption, I need to
incorporate a relatively large area as a market. The prefecture is an ideal unit for
this purpose.
My sample consists of 1,265 homes. The details of the sampling methodology is
summarized as follows: the editors of Shuukan Asahi Mook (2011) sent a question-
naires to all private homes except those that had a past legal fault. The population
consists of \approximately 5,000" homes, in their words. They edited the book us-
ing 2,343 responses. Of the listed homes in the book, I eliminated 745 homes where
long-term care is optional. From the remaining 1,598 homes, 324 homes are removed
from the sample because of missing information. I further excluded 9 homes in prefec-
tures that have only one home because the monopoly market would yield a di®erent
market structure to my oligopoly model. Approximately half of homes do not have
a response. The low response rate might be caused by the enforcement of an early
deadline by editors, speci¯cally three months.
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The share of a home shm is de¯ned as the ratio of the number of the residents
in the hmth home over the number of the potential consumers in the market m. As
seen in equation (3.9), there must be a positive share for the outside option. Then, I
included those who did not choose to live in any private nursing home in the potential
consumers. I adopted the Category 1 elders with an eligibility level of Care Required
1 or higher, which is the minimum level typically required to receive institutional care
under coverage of the LTCI, in the potential consumers. Table 2 shows numbers of
the homes and Category 1 (age 65 years or more) elders in prefectures.
Table 2 is here
I have several observed variables related to prices: a monthly fee phm , an initial
payment Fhm and an expiration period Thm . The monthly rent fhm is created using
Fhm and Thm , as mentioned earlier. Several homes report two price variables for
their minimum and maximum. Speci¯cally, the expiration period is unique for 1,226
homes, but the monthly fee and the initial payment are unique only for approximately
half of the homes. Because there are only a few homes that o®er multiple options for
expiration periods, the variation in initial payments must be caused by a variation
in monthly rents. Variations in monthly fees and monthly rents may be caused by
quality di®erences in services and rooms. However, the lack of variation in expiration
periods implies that separating equilibria as a tool to manage the longevity risk do
not seem to occur.
I have two categories of explanatory variables: components of x shift the consumer
utility for decision making, and components of w are characteristics of the marginal
cost per resident. In addition to the common elements for these two categories, as
mentioned in Section 4.5, I need exclusion restrictions that are home-speci¯c variables
only in x and market-speci¯c variables only in w.
For common observable elements on the demand and supply sides, I adopt three
variables from Shuukan Asahi Mook (2011). The ¯rst variable is the number of
residents per worker(Worker). This variable clearly a®ects the utility because it
determines the amount of time a worker can spends on each resident. This variable
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additionally determine a labor cost, which is an important element of the marginal
cost. For private homes that provide long-term care as a default option, this number
is legally required to be 3 or fewer.
The second common variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity when
the home is operated by a chain(Chain). The demand side e®ect of this variable can
be both positive or negative, because a chain operation might imply either e±cient
operation or a stereotypical care. Its cost e®ect is also ambiguous because chains might
operate more e±ciently in service provisions but spend more on advertisements. In
the private nursing home market, there is no dominant chain that has more than 20%
of the share. Then I create the dummy variable as a bundle of six chains, namely
Benesse Style Care, Message, Watami no Kaigo, Nichii Group, Life Commune and
Tsukui, which account for more than 20 homes in our dataset11.
The third common variable is years since opening(Years). On the demand side,
that a home has survived for a long time might imply both high quality from the
accumulation of experiences and disutility from old facilities. In addition, the supply
side e®ect is indeterminate due to the coexistence of the accumulation of knowledge
and high repair costs.
Next, I propose my exclusion restrictions. On the demand side, I adopt a home-
speci¯c variable of the occupancy rate(Occupancy). This variable a®ects the con-
sumer utility because an extremely small occupancy rate might be a signal that the
home has some problems. On the other hand, this variable does not a®ect the per-
resident cost.
For the supply side exclusion restrictions, I use two market-speci¯c variables of
cost shifters: local averages of rents(Rent) and wages(Wage). These variables a®ect
the marginal cost but not the utility, given the other price variables. Rent is de¯ned
as an annual average of monthly rents per 3.3 m2 in the capital city of a prefecture,
11From a similar motive to the chain dummy, I tried to adopt another dummy variable that takes
unity when the home is operated by a non-pro¯t organization. However, I eliminate this variable
from my empirical study because the convergence of its coe±cient is quite slow, and there is no
serious di®erence for coe±cient estimates of the other variables, with or without this variable. The
slow convergence might be caused by an insu±cient sample size because this dummy variable takes
unity for less than 10% of my sample.
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which is taken from the 2010 Annual Report on the Retail Price Survey. For the
average wage, there are no reliable data speci¯c to care workers. Therefore, I adapt
information of the medical and welfare sectors, which include care workers. Wage is
de¯ned as the quotient of annual wages plus bonuses over 12. These components are
from the 2010 Basic Survey on Wage Structure.
Table 3 is here
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. I adjust sev-
eral volatile variables to stabilize our estimation in the following exercises of my in-
ference. First, I standardize Years, Rent and Wage to have means of zero and unit
variances. Second, I divide several variables generated from T and f by constants.
Speci¯cally, F is divided by 1000 and T; T 2; f and f2, which appear in ¡(T; f ;°), are
divided by 10; 1000; 10 and 100, respectively.
5.2 Estimation results
Before proceeding to the results, I determine case-speci¯c components in my econo-
metric frameworks. First, the hyperparameters are set as follows:
¯d » N(0; 1000I); ¯s » N(0; 1000I); (5.1)
° » N(0; 10I); ® » N(1; 10); (5.2)
¿! » Gamma(3; 10); ¿» » Gamma(3; 10): (5.3)
I use normal proposal distributions, as mentioned above. I adjust their variances
to have modest rates of acceptance in the MH algorithm. Speci¯cally, the acceptance
rates for parameters are located within the range between 0.29 and 0.6.
For the Polya tree mixture, I choose primitives as c = 10 and J = 5. I additionally
adopt several alternative values to check the robustness of this choice. For c, 1, 100
and 1; 000 are incorporated. Among them, c = 100 and 1; 000 yield posterior samples
similar to my primary result. c = 1, which is used in the studies by Hanson and
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Johnson (2002) and Hanson (2006), yields similar posterior means for parameters but
shows a slow convergence. Additionally, I check J = 8. This value is recommended
by Hanson and Johnson (2002) as their rule of thumbs, namely J ' log2H. However,
this value induces a slow convergence, although it yields similar posterior means to
J = 5. Both c = 1 and J = 8 impose ¯ner de¯nitions of bins than c = 10 and J = 5.
The slow convergence with these primitives is caused by the complexity of my model
relative to the previous statistical papers.
In our implementation of the MCMC samplers, I generated 1,000,000 posterior
samples after discarding 100,000 initial samples as the burn-in period. The computa-
tion took approximately 20 days using three cores of the Intel Xeon X5470 processor
(3.33GHz).
Table 4 is here
Table 4 reports the estimation results. The ¯rst and second columns show poste-
rior means and standard deviations, the third column represents 95% credible inter-
vals, and the last column reports the ine±ciency factors(IF). The maximum of the
ine±ciency factors is 12; 880, which implies that we would obtain the same variance
of the posterior sample means from more than 75 uncorrelated draws, even in the
worst case. For the sake of the convergence diagnosis, I additionally present ¯gures of
posterior sample paths and the posterior densities of the MCMC samples in Appendix
D.
Overall, the estimated posterior means for coe±cient parameters take reasonable
values. On the demand side, Worker a®ects consumer utility negatively, because
consumers prefer homes with a su±cient capacity of care workers. The positive coef-
¯cient for Chain indicates e±cient service provision of chains. The e®ect of Years
is not clear, indicating a complicated role of the history. In addition, the exclusion
restriction Occupancy has a strongly positive e®ect on consumer utility, which im-
plies that the popularity of a home is a good proxy for its quality. Furthermore, the
mean e®ect of an initial payment on the utility, ®F , takes a strongly positive value.
It is di±cult to interpret this result alone, but at least it indicates a complicated role
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of the initial payment. I provide the further consideration in the prediction analysis
later.
On the supply side, because the logarithm of the marginal cost is de¯ned as
log(mchm) = w
0
hm
¯s + !hm , a positive coe±cient means that the corresponding ex-
planatory variable increases the marginal cost and hence decreases the pro¯t of homes.
The negative e®ect of Worker means that a reduction in the labor forces decreases
the marginal cost, as expected. The positive coe±cient for Chain implies that ad-
vertisement costs are higher than the revenue from the e±cient operation of chains.
Years has a negative e®ect, which can be interpreted as the accumulation of knowl-
edge decreases the running costs. For the exclusion restrictions, Rent has a strongly
positive coe±cient as an increasing factor of the marginal cost. However, the sign of
Wage is ambiguous. This ambiguity might imply that the local average wage of the
medical and welfare sectors does not precisely capture the wages of institutional care
workers in private nursing homes.
It is interesting to ¯nd a bimodal posterior density of the scale parameter of
the Polya tree mixture ¿!. This density is not caused by a problem of incomplete
convergence but by the true posterior shape, as seen in the sample path in which
the chain repeatedly visits both peeks. The peculiar shape of the posterior density
function indicates that the distribution of !m is di®erent from common probability
distributions, such as the normal distribution. This result supports our usage of
nonparametric modeling.
5.3 Prediction results
Next, I conduct a prediction analysis based on the above estimation result. In the
dual-loop Monte Carlo integral, the number of the iterations for the outer loop is set
to be L = 50. µls are taken from the posterior samples obtained in the estimation
step at intervals of 13,000 periods. Because the maximum of the ine±ciency factors
is 12,880, I can treat these µls as independent samples from posterior distributions.
The inner loop is set to have R = 5; 000 posterior sample generations of qnewh and
pnewh for h = 1; :::; 32 after discarding R
0 = 5; 000 initial samples as the burn-in period.
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For each of µl, l = 1; :::; 50, posterior sample paths of the predicted values exhibit a
su±cient convergence of the inner loops.
When Hm is extremely large, as in Tokyo, which has 281 homes, it is computation-
ally burdensome to achieve the convergence for the prediction procedure in Section
4.4. Instead, I concentrate on Shizuoka prefecture, which has 32 homes. In the predic-
tion analysis below, I do not compare the lifetime payments for homes that currently
do not collect the initial payment, although their information is used for prediction.
Then, my target is the remaining 19 homes.
Figure 1 is here
Figure 1 presents a prediction result for the short-Lived consumers, ¿i · Th.
The X axis indexes homes, while the Y axis measures a payment in 10,000 yen.
Each home has two bars of monthly payments for before and after the intervention.
Figure 1 shows that lifetime payments after the intervention are smaller than before
the intervention. In other words, short-lived consumers can reduce their lifetime
payment without the initial payment mechanism. Under this circumstance, longevity
risks are pooled and distributed uniformly to all the residents. Therefore, short-lived
consumers cannot recollect the risk premium and forced overpayment.
Figures 2 and 3 are here
Next, I consider long-lived consumers, Th < ¿i. Figures 2 and 3 gives comparisons
of ph¿ + fhTh and pnewh ¿ for ¿ = 240 and 360, which correspond to 20 and 30 years
of remaining lifetime, respectively. The two bars show the lifetime payments before
and after the intervention.
The lifetime payments after the intervention exceed the payments before the inter-
vention only in the case where a consumer with 30 years of remaining lifetime chooses
a speci¯c home. In other words, to recollect the risk premium, consumers need to
stay at a home at least for 30 years. However, in practice, 30 additional years of
life are not realistic for entrants into the private nursing homes with long-term care.
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In addition, the expenses without the initial payment can be further reduced if we
consider an interest rate.
Combining the above results, I conclude that the initial payment mechanism gen-
erally forces consumers to pay more. This overpayment might be a result of a con-
sumer's rational risk management. However, there must be a loss of the consumer
welfare in the aggregate level, because the overpayment is common for most con-
sumers. Consumers may be better o® with a combined policy of abandonment of the
initial payment mechanism and a government-driven management of the longevity
risk, similar to the safety net mechanism in the United States.
6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a nonparametric Bayesian approach for structural econo-
metrics. This approach enables a °exible prediction analysis without a distributional
assumption. Although I have adopted the model of Berry et al. (1995) in this paper,
my framework can work for general structural models. The validity of my method
is shown in an empirical study of the Japanese private nursing home market. My
prediction result implies that an outdated circumstance forces higher payments for
most consumers today.
For empirical researchers, the elder care industry in Japan is an attractive ¯eld
because the radical long-term care insurance program has rich implications for other
aging countries. Although this paper concentrates on a speci¯c market of private
nursing homes, the long-term care industry has various sectors due to the market-
oriented insurance program. As a future task, more studies from di®erent perspectives
in this economy are required.
A Polya tree mixture
This appendix complements Section 4.2 by introducing the Polya tree mixture in a
manner similar to the intuitive de¯nition of Christensen et al. (2008). To begin with,
I de¯ne a Polya tree, which is an original form of the Polya tree mixture. First,
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I de¯ne a prior distribution for the Polya tree. Econometricians need to specify a
base measure G on the support ­, which has a well-de¯ned density g and the known
median ¹.
The prior distribution of the Polya tree is constructed using a J step iterative
process. In the ¯rst level, the support ­ is separated into two parts: R11 and R12,
which are below and above ¹, respectively. With respect to the base measure G, both
of these regions originally have probabilities of 1=2 because ¹ is the median of the
base measure. We change these probabilities to ¸11 and ¸12 such that ¸11 + ¸12 = 1.
In this manipulation, the shape of G is kept unchanged, but the integration constants
in these regions are changed. Using the analogy of the histogram, the regions on Rs
are called bins.
The second level creates a binary separation for each of R11 and R12 at the 25 and
75 percentiles, respectively. Then, the probabilities are changed in the same manner
as in the ¯rst level. For example, on R11, the new bins R21 and R22 have probabilities
¸21 and ¸22 such that ¸21 + ¸22 = ¸11. Such binary separations are repeated until
the terminal level J .
As a result, one has a histogram-like prior distribution. The parameters of this
prior distribution are the probabilities of bins ¸j;·j for j = 1; :::; J and ·j = 1; 2; :::; 2
j .
The probabilistic structure of these variables can be represented simply using an addi-
tional latent variable as follows. From the above construction via binary separations,
each level creates new probabilities by splitting them from the previous level. Let the
latent variable ³j;·j¡1 2 [0; 1] be a proportion of the probability of the previous level,
¸j¡1;·j , which is distributed to a new bin Rj;2·j¡1¡1. Then, we have a representation
for the new probability as
¸j;2·j¡1¡1 = ³j;·j¡1¸j¡1;·j¡1 ; (A.1)
¸j;2·j¡1 = (1¡ ³j;·j¡1)¸j¡1;·j¡1 : (A.2)
Due to conjugacy, it is convenient to impose an independent and identical Beta
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prior distribution for ³j;·j¡1 . The prior and posterior distributions are written as
follows:
³j;·j¡1 » Beta(®j;2·j¡1¡1; ®j;2·j¡1); (A.3)
³j;·j¡1 j!1; :::; !i¡1 » Beta(®j;2·j¡1¡1 + nj;2·j¡1¡1; ®j;2·j¡1 + nj;2·j¡1); (A.4)
where ®¢;¢s are hyperparameters, and nj;k =
Pi¡1
h=1 I[!h 2 Rj;k] denotes the sample
frequency.
Our purpose is the construction of the nonparametric predictive density of !ij!1; :::; !i¡1; ~µ.
For this purpose, I integrate out the nuisance parameters ¸ = ¸11; ¸12; :::; ¸J;2J and
obtain
f(!ij!1; :::; !i¡1; ~µ) =
JY
j=1
®j;kj + nj;kj
®j;2·j¡1¡1 + ®j;2·j¡1 + nj¡1;·j¡1
I[wi 2 Rj;kj ]g(!i); (A.5)
where kj is 2·j¡1 ¡ 1 or 2·j¡1.
The original Polya tree that is de¯ned above has a similar weakness as a histogram,
namely discontinuity at the borders of bins. This problem is caused by the fact that
borders are de¯ned as percentiles of the unique and ¯xed base measure. To overcome
this discontinuity problem, the Polya tree mixture employs smoothing of the borders
by introducing a variable base measure, denoted by G¿ , where ¿ is a scale parameter.
This scale parameter is also estimated and integrated out in the de¯nition of the
nonparametric predictive density such that
¼(!ij!1; :::; !i¡1; ~µ) =
Z
¼(!ij!1; :::; !i¡1; ~µ; ¿)¼(¿ j~µ)d¿: (A.6)
To achieve the median constraint, I assume that ¹ does not depend on ¿ . Because
¿ determines the percentile of G¿ other than ¹, this integration smooths the bins
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except for those that are de¯ned in the ¯rst level. On the other hand, discontinuity
at ¹ enforces a median restriction such that the marginal distribution for !i satis¯es
Pr(!i · ¹) = 1=2.
B An explicit representation for the Jacobian matrix in
the likelihood function
This appendix provides a supplement for the estimation methodology described in
Section 4.3. Speci¯cally, I present a closed form expression for the Jacobian matrix
in the likelihood function (4.6). A straightforward calculation yields the following
Jm =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
@!1m=@p1m ::: @!1m=@pHm @!1m=@q1m ::: @!1m=@qHm
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
@!Hm=@p1m ::: @!Hm=@pHm @!Hm=@q1m ::: @!Hm=@qHm
@»1m=@p1m ::: @»1m=@pHm @»1m=@q1m ::: @»1m=@qHm
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
@»Hm=@p1m ::: @»Hm=@pHm @»Hm=@q1m ::: @»Hm=@qHm
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
;
(B.1)
in which
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@!hm
@plm
=
8><>:
1
phm+[®(exp(qhm )¡1)]¡1+fhm¡(Thm ;fhm ;°)(´ Zhm) for lm = hm
0 for lm 6= hm
;
(B.2)
@!hm
@qlm
=
8><>:
³
¡ exp(qhm )
®[exp(qhm )¡1]2
´
Zhm for lm = hm
0 for lm 6= hm
; (B.3)
@»hm
@plm
=
8><>: ® for lm = hm0 for lm 6= hm ; (B.4)
@»hm
@qlm
=
8><>:
1 + exp[qhm ]
1¡PHmkm=1 exp[qkm ] for lm = hm
exp[qlm ]
1¡PHmkm=1 exp[qkm ] for lm 6= hm
: (B.5)
Using the formula for the determinant by parts and the fact Zhm > 0, which is
guaranteed under the support condition (4.10), we have
jdet(Jm)j = jdet(Dm)j
³ HmY
km=1
Zkm
´
; (B.6)
where Dm is a matrix whose (i; j) element is de¯ned as
dmij =
8><>:
1 + exp(qim )
1¡PHmkm=1 exp(qkm ) +
exp(qim )
[1¡exp(qim )]2 for i = j
exp(qim )
1¡PHmkm=1 exp(qkm ) for i 6= j
: (B.7)
Consequently, Dm does not depend on parameters µ but on a dependent variable
qm. Thus, jdet(Dm)j can be negligible for estimation, whereas it must be considered
for a prediction analysis.
C Expression for conditional predictive densities
This appendix details the prediction technique described in Section 4.4. Speci¯cally, I
derive the conditional predictive distributions for qnewhm jpnewm ; qnew(¡hm); fnewhm = 0; Tnewhm =
0;µ;Data and pnewhm jqnewm ;pnew(¡hm); fnewhm = 0; Tnewhm = 0;µ;Data for hm = 1; 2; :::;Hm.
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First, in the similar manner to derivation of the likelihood function, I obtain the joint
predictive density for the dependent variables using a change of variable as
¼(pnewm ; q
new
m jfnewhm = 0; Tnewhm = 0;µ;Data)
= ¼!;»[!hm(p
new
m ; q
new
m ; f
new
hm = 0; T
new
hm = 0;
~µ); »hm(p
new
m ; q
new
m ; f
new
hm = 0; T
new
hm = 0;
~µ)jData]
jdet(Jm)j (C.1)
/ jDmj
HmY
hm=1
"
Zhm(p
new
hm ; q
new
hm ;µ)g¿! [!
new
hm (p
new
hm ; qhnewm ;µ)]g¿» [»
new
hm (p
new
hm ; q
new
m ;µ)]
JY
j=1
cj2 + n²[j;¿! ;!newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](!)
2cj2 + n²[j¡1;¿! ;!newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](!)
JY
j=1
cj2 + n²[j;¿»;»newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](»)
2cj2 + n²[j¡1;¿»;»newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](»)
#
;
(C.2)
where
!newhm (p
new
hm ; q
new
hm ;µ) = ln
³
pnewhm +
1
®[exp(qnewhm )¡ 1]
´
¡whm¯s; (C.3)
»newhm (p
new
hm ; q
new
m ;µ) = q
new
hm ¡ ~x0hm ~¯d ¡ ln
h
1¡
HmX
km
exp(qnewkm )
i
+ pnewhm ®; (C.4)
Zhm(p
new
hm ; q
new
hm ;µ) =
1
pnewhm + f®[exp(qnewhm )¡ 1]g¡1
; (C.5)
and the support conditions yield
0 < 1¡
HmX
km=1
exp(qnewkm ); 0 < p
new
hm +
1
®[exp(qnewhm )¡ 1]
: (C.6)
Given the above joint predictive densities, I can obtain the conditional predictive
densities to implement an MCMC prediction sampler. The conditional distribution
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for pnewhm is:
¼(pnewhm jqnewm ;pnew(¡hm); fnewhm = 0; Tnewhm=0;µ;Data)
/ Zhm(pnewhm ; qnewhm ;µ)g¿! [!newhm (phm ; qhm ;µ)]g¿» [»newhm (phm ; qm;µ)]
JY
j=1
cj2 + n²[j;¿! ;!newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](!)
2cj2 + n²[j¡1;¿! ;!newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](!)
JY
j=1
cj2 + n²[j;¿»;»newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](»)
2cj2 + n²[j¡1;¿»;»newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](»)
;
(C.7)
where
pnewhm >
1
®[1¡ exp(qnewhm )]
: (C.8)
On the other hand, the conditional predictive density for qnewhm is
¼(qnewhm jpnewm ; qnew(¡hm); fnewhm = 0; Tnewhm=0;µ;Data)
/
MY
m=1
jDmjZhm(pnewhm ; qnewhm ;µ)g¿! [!newhm (phm ; qhm ;µ)]
JY
j=1
cj2 + n²[j;¿! ;!newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](!)
2cj2 + n²[j¡1;¿! ;!newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](!)
HmY
hm=1
"
g¿» [»
new
hm (phm ; qm;µ)]
JY
j=1
cj2 + n²[j;¿»;»newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](»)
2cj2 + n²[j¡1;¿»;»newhm (pnewhm ;qnewhm ;µ)](»)
#
;
; (C.9)
where
qnewhm < log[1¡
X
km 6=hm
exp(qnewkm )]; q
new
hm < log
h
1¡ 1
®pnewhm
i
: (C.10)
D Estimated posterior densities and sample paths
Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 are here
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E Tables and Figures
1999 2000(LTCI) 2001 2002 2003
Private # Homes 298 350 400 508 694
Capacities 32,302 37,467 41,445 46,561 56,837
Public # Homes 4,214 4,463 4,651 4,870 5,084
Capacities 283,822 298,912 314,192 330,916 346,069
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Private # Homes 1,045 1,406 1,968 2,671 3,400
Capacities 76,128 964,12 123,155 147,981 176,935
Public # Homes 5,291 5,535 5,716 5,892 6,015
Capacities 363,747 383,326 399,352 412,807 422,703
Table 1: Numbers of the institutions and the residential capacities of public and
private nursing homes
Figure 1: Prediction result for short-lived consumers (¿i · Th):
X axis indexes homes and Y axis measures monthly fees in 10,000 yen
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Prefecture # Homes # Category 1 elders Prefecture # Homes # Category 1 elders
Hokkaido 38 234,434 Aichi 70 214,087
Iwate 2 62,053 Mie 3 78,731
Miyagi 15 84,786 Shiga 4 45,764
Akita 2 61,281 Kyoto 7 108,892
Yamagata 3 55,587 Osaka 120 358,001
Fukushima 7 84,428 Hyogo 61 223,140
Ibaraki 16 90,099 Nara 9 53,548
Tochigi 6 64,671 Shimane 3 40,650
Gumma 12 75,409 Okayama 28 93,412
Saitama 76 189,482 Hiroshima 17 128,505
Chiba 74 174,744 Yamaguchi 5 71,385
Tokyo 281 423,639 Kagawa 6 46,256
Kanagawa 232 264,673 Ehime 12 74,667
Niigata 15 109,182 Fukuoka 52 203,339
Ishikawa 4 48,238 Saga 7 37,445
Yamanashi 3 31,571 Nagasaki 4 78,863
Nagano 13 92,933 Kumamoto 3 86,886
Gifu 7 75,766 Oita 9 60,433
Shizuoka 32 128,088 Kagoshima 7 87,718
Table 2: Numbers of homes and elders in prefectures, excluding prefuctures with zero
or one home
Variable Notation in paper Mean S.D.
Monthly fee (10,000yen) p 19.90 6.28
Initial payment per month (10,000yen) f 10.90 13.96
Expiration period(month) T 46.34 42.17
Share s 0.00032 0.00045
Log(Share) q -8.418 0.798
# Residents per worker Worker 2.523 0.476
Years from opening Years 7.378 5.986
Occupancy rate Occupancy 0.914 0.146
Chain dummy Chain 0.315 0.465
Local average rent Rent 6051 1813
Local average wage (1,000 yen) Wage 1025 120
Sample size H 1265
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
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Variable Mean S.D. 95% Interval IF
¯d Constant -4.298*** 0.227 [-4.728,-3.837] 607
# Residents per worker 0.678*** 0.054 [-0.787,-0.579] 250
Years from opening 0.017 0.029 [-0.042,0.071] 35
Occupancy rate 0.440** 0.161 [0.114,0.752] 411
Chain dummy 0.378*** 0.052 [0.278,0.484] 40
®F 0.051*** 0.020 [0.012,0.089] 92
¯s Constant 2.928*** 0.058 [2.823,3.052] 12924
# Residents per worker -0.415*** 0.022 [-0.462,-0.369] 12288
Years from opening -0.095*** 0.016 [-0.124,-0.068] 3159
Chain dummy 0.217*** 0.022 [0.163,0.255] 3603
Local average rent 0.189*** 0.014 [0.165,0.223] 811
Local average wage 0.009 0.014 [-0.044,0.012] 706
® 0.139*** 0.001 [0.137,0.140] 477
° °0 0.283 2.982 [-5.884,5.741] 16
°T1 -2.472 2.235 [-7.392,1.309] 22
°T2 -2.191 2.328 [-7.286,1.568] 13
°f1 -0.757 2.964 [-6.682,4.853] 24
°f2 -2.488 1.993 [-7.159,0.171] 10
°fT -0.509 3.130 [-6.672,5.597] 6
¿ ¿! 2.899*** 0.360 [2.258,3.404] 3043
¿» 0.919*** 0.080 [0.769,1.081] 45
Sample size 1265
Table 4: Estimation result for real data
¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ indicate that 99%, 95% and 90% credible intervals do not include zero,
respectively.
47
Figure 2: Prediction results for long-lived consumers: 20 year lifetime (¿i > Th):
¿i = 240
X axis indexes homes and Y axis measures lifetime payments in 10,000 yen
Figure 3: Prediction results for long-lived consumers: 30 year lifetime (¿i > Th):
¿i = 360
X axis indexes homes and Y axis measures lifetime payments in 10,000 yen
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Figure 4: Posterior densities for the MCMC sampler, 1
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Figure 5: Posterior densities for the MCMC sampler, 2
49
0 100000200000300000
−4.5
−4.0
−3.5
 
_d:Constant 
0 100000200000300000
−0.8
−0.7
−0.6
−0.5
 
_d:Residents per worker 
0 100000200000300000
0.0
0.1
 
_d:Years from opening 
0 100000200000300000
0.0
0.5
1.0
 
_d:Occupancy rate 
0 100000200000300000
0.3
0.4
0.5
 
_d:Chain dummy 
0 100000200000300000
0.00
0.05
0.10

_F 
0 100000200000300000
0
10  _0 
0 100000200000300000
−5
0
5  _T1 
0 100000200000300000
−10
−5
0
5  _T2 
0 100000200000300000
−10
0
10  _f1 
0 100000200000300000
−10
−5
0

_f2 
0 100000200000300000
−5
0
5
10  _fT 
0 100000200000300000
0.138
0.140
0.142

0 100000200000300000
2.9
3.1
 
_s:Constant 
0 100000200000300000
−0.45
−0.40
−0.35
 
_s: Residents per worker 
0 100000200000300000
−0.125
−0.100
−0.075
−0.050
 
_s:Years from opening 
Figure 6: Sample paths for the MCMC sampler, 1
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Figure 7: Sample paths for the MCMC sampler, 2
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